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Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints
Facing Random Regulatory
Inspections in Japan and the United
States
Andrew Chin*
On the morning of January 26, 1998, a team of 100 officials from the
Tokyo Prosecutor's Office, accompanied by national television reporters,
marched through the front door of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (the2
"Ministry")' to make the first arrests of Ministry officials in over 50 years.
The chief of the Ministry's bank inspection office, Koichi Miyakawa, and
the assistant chief of the control division, Toshimi Taniuchi, were held on
suspicion of taking bribes from commercial banks in exchange for information about the dates of surprise inspections and lenient treatment of financial irregularities. Later that week, Japanese Finance Minister Hiroshi
Mitsuzuka 4 and Vice Finance Minister Takeshi Komuras resigned to take
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP. B.S. (Texas), 1987, D. Phil.
(Oxford), 1991, J.D. (Yale), 1998. Portions of this article were written while the author was
a 1997-1998 Olin Fellow in Law, Economics and Public Policy at Yale Law School. The
author would like to thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for helpful comments.
1See Jon Choy, Ministry ofFinanceat Centerof Whirlwind, JEI REP., Feb. 6, 1998.
2
See Shigemi Sato, Japan's Finance Minister Quits in Bribery Scandal, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRESSE,
Jan. 28, 1998.
3

See Choy, supra note 1. Prosecutors said Miyakawa had accepted 6.2 million yen in
bribes from Asahi Bank and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in return for covering up his inspectors'
findings of bad loans and disclosing the dates and locations of surprise bank inspections;
Taniuchi was suspected of receiving 2.2 million yen in bribes from Sanwa Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. See Arrested MOF InspectorShelved Finding on Bad Loans, JAPAN
WKLY.
MoNrrOR, Feb. 2, 1998.
4
See Sato, supra note 2.
5
See Miwa Suzuki, EscalatingJapaneseBribery Scandal Claims Top Finance Official,

AGENCE FRANCE-PREsSE, Jan. 29, 1998.
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responsibility for the widening scandal. In all, 112 ministry officials 6 and
six of Japan's ten leading banks 7 have been sanctioned for their involvement in the scandal.
The raid on the Ministry provided a dramatic prologue to the Japanese
government's current initiative to reform the nation's long-troubled banking
system. The full extent of the Ministry's role in exacerbating the Japanese
banking crisis has only come to light with disclosures by the newly created
Financial Supervision Agency. The Ministry has been forced to acknowledge that its supervisory failures permitted the banking system to hide approximately $1 trillion in bad loans, with some analysts estimating that the
actual figure is closer to $2 trillion.8
The Japanese experience suggests the more general difficulty of designing surprise inspection programs to enforce industrial regulations.
Random, unannounced inspections present unique problems relating to deterrence, corruption, and due process, each requiring a careful balancing of
interests. This Article surveys these problems with reference to the Japanese banking system as well as various American regulatory contexts, and
provides an analytical framework for evaluating and improving strategies
for enforcing regulations and fighting corruption. The main finding is that
any effective law enforcement scheme based on surprise inspections must
be supported by specific anti-corruption sanctions. An additional finding is
that recently adopted self-regulation programs and proposed reforms to the
extent that they link the probability of future inspections to past compliance
have some troublesome aspects.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I presents a rational actor
model of legal compliance under an enforcement regime based on random
inspections and identifies two classes of reforms that can be applied in
combination to improve aggregate compliance. Part II introduces the
problem of corrupt tip-offs into the model and argues that exogenous reforms are necessary to combat corruption. Part I surveys the use of random administrative inspections in the United States, reviews the approaches
taken by four such programs to improve compliance and fight corruption,
and describes the various constraints under which they must operate. Part
IV conducts a similar analysis of banking regulation and reform in Japan.
This Article does not attempt to provide a complete survey of bank
regulation in Japan or the United States. The more modest aim is to present
case studies of various random inspection programs, thereby obtaining a
systems analysis of the constraints facing reformers at Japan's Financial
Supervision Agency. However, to the extent that Japan's recent financial
6

See Japan'sFinancialSupervision Agency to Start Work on Monday, Agence FrancePresse,
June 21, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 2306174.
7
See More JapaneseBanks Linked to Bribery,IRISH TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998.
8See Tony Boyd, Rescue May Not Save All Shaky FinancialPlayers, AUSTL. FIN. Rv.,
Oct. 16, 1998, at 50.
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reform initiative thus far has targeted the constraints that led to the 1998
raid, the analysis provides a basis for guarded optimism and suggests the
complexity of the reform task ahead.
I. DETERRENCE: FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER REFORMS

Surprise inspections encourage compliance through deterrence by assuring a positive probability that noncompliance will be sanctioned. Suppose that each business covered by a regulatory inspection program behaves
as a private consumer, whose behavior is indifferent to the behavior of other
businesses. A business will choose to comply with the regulation if the cost
of compliance is less than the expected cost of sanctions. Where there is a
culture of compliance in which the marginal costs of compliance are rapidly
decreasing, extended periods of compliance may be achieved. The following analysis considers how best to maximize the aggregate duration of
compliance, assuming that is the goal of regulatory enforcement.
Let C,{r) represent the cost to the i-th business of compliance over a
continuous time interval of duration r. Let pi'(t) be the probability that
business i is inspected at time t. Assume that C and pi are twice continuously differentiable. Let Di be the expected penalty to business i, given that
it is inspected at a time when it is not in compliance.
The first-order condition for business i is pi'(t) D1j1 Ci'(r). Thus, the
business will minimize its total costs by choosing to comply over a collection of minimal time intervals [ta, tb], for which
Ci'(tb-t,) = pi(t.) Di = PAOtb Di
and pi"(t) D, > Cj"(tb-t), pi"(tb) Di <_Cj"(tb-ta). Figure 1 illustrates that

each interval [ta, tb] is found by choosing the parameter s so that the graph
of the function C,'(21s-tl) intersects the graph of pi(t) Di at two points with
equal ordinates.
Figure 1:
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9
The cost of noncompliance also includes moral costs. These are not considered here,
but may be accounted for by interpreting 6{r) to be the net cost of compliance less any
moral costs of noncompliance.
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Since compliance over an x+y time interval can be achieved by concatenating intervals of duration x and y, we have C,(x+y) < .Cj(x) + C,{y) for
all x, y > 0. The inequality is very likely to be strict, because of economies
of scale in long-term compliance. Thus, without loss of generality, we can
assume that the functions C1 are sublinear (i.e., Ci"< 0 everywhere).
This analysis identifies two systematic approaches to improving aggregate compliance. First, the cost of sanctions relative to the cost of compliance can be increased by: (a) increasing the penalty D; (b) increasing the
overall probability of inspections pi'; or (c) reducing the cost of compliance
Ci. Second, the duration of the compliance periods can be made more sensitive to changes in the relative cost of sanctions by: (a) reducing the variation in the probability of inspections [pi'1; (b) increasing the time economies
of compliance IC,'1; or (c) explicitly targeting businesses with relatively
high compliance costs.
These sets of approaches shall be referred to asfirst- and second-order
reforms, respectively. First-order reforms are constrained by constitutional
and statutory limits on searches and sanctions, enforcement resources, and
the positive objectives of the regulation. When first-order reforms are in
place, however, second-order reforms may supplement enforcement efforts
by reinforcing a culture of compliance. This taxonomy of reforms will be
informative in reviewing American and Japanese regulatory practices in
parts III and IV, respectively.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION

The purpose of surprise inspections is to enhance law enforcement efforts by increasing the likelihood that violations will be detected.' 0 Consider now the case where an official provides business i with reliable
information that the only inspections during time interval [tM, tN]will take
place during time interval [t,,, t], with tM < t,< t,< tN. Assuming Bayesian
updating, the business will behave as if the expected cost of noncompliance
were

fl0

for t T [tin ,tn]

for te [tm ,t,], where

p'(t) Di R

R

p(tN) - p(tM)

At")- At.)

"°See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) (finding frequent surprise inspections "crucial" to detecting stolen auto parts in junkyards because stolen cars are quickly
disassembled).
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Such a tip-off thus eliminates any incentive for compliance outside of
the interval [tm,t,], but increases the incentive for compliance within the interval [tm,t,]. Aggregate compliance may be improved in the case where the
levels of sanctions and enforcement resources had achieved deterrence
during [tM,t] only on a proper subset of the interval [tm,t,]. Except for this
narrow case, however, tip-offs impede regulatory enforcement.
Given this harm, regulators may seek to deter tip-offs by a combination
of specific coercive (i.e., criminal) sanctions and a reduction of the underlying economic incentives. In the typical case where R is large, the surplus
created by the tip-off will be approximately equal to the minimum between
the cost of compliance and the expected cost of sanctions, integrated over
[tM,tm] u [t,,tN]. As noted in part I, any reductions in Ci'(r)will be limited
by the positive objectives of the regulation. An across-the-board reduction
in pi'(t) D- for all values of t would hamper first-order reforms, and a selective reduction in pi'(t) Di targeted to t e [tM,tm] u [t,,tN] would impede both
first- and second-order reforms.
This analysis suggests that a random inspection program cannot simultaneously maximize compliance and control corruption. Therefore,
specific sanctions are necessary to deter tip-offs. Despite this, there are few
statutory penalties for giving advance notice of a surprise inspection in the
United States or Japan, and prosecutions under these statutes are rarer still. 1
III. RANDOM INSPECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, unannounced inspections are employed by both
federal and state officials in a wide range of regulatory contexts. At the
federal level, unannounced inspections play a key role in the enforcement of
2 occupational safety,13
laws and regulations in such areas as food safety,
5 child care, 6 environmental protection, 17
14
medical safety, airport security,
workplace drug testing,'8 manufacturing of government-licensed items,' 9
" See infra section III.D and part IV.
12See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 301.78-10(c)(2) (1998) (irradiation of quarantined fruits and
vegetables); 9 C.F.R. § 94.8 (1998) (processing of imported pork).
13See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,196, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7902, at 1401(i) (West 1998) (occupational safety and health hazards); 29 C.F.R. § 1960.31(a) (1998)
(same).
14See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 493.49(b)(2) (1998) (laboratories participating in Medicare and
Medicaid).
'5 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44916(b) (West 1998).
16See, e.g., 14 U.S.C.A. § 515(c) (1998) (child development services for Coast Guard
employees).
17See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 55.8 (1998) (coastal air quality).
laSee, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Pt. 26, App. A, at (m) (1998) (employees of nuclear energy facilities); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I (1998) (Department of Transportation employees performing
safety-sensitive functions); 49 C.F.R § 40.29(1) (same); 49 C.F.R. § 199.13(a)(2) (pipeline
workers); 49 C.F.R. § 219.701(b) (railroad workers).
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and custody of valuable government property. 20 States also authorize unannounced inspections for enforcing laws and regulations governing securities
23 and
trading, 2' health care,22 environmental protection (both independently
24), building construction, 25 transportation, 26
in cooperation with other states
27 28
OS29.3
9 and restaurants.3 ° In addition, the federal
agriculture,27 prisons,
schools,
government conditions certain grants on the requirement of unannounced
31
inspections by state authorities as a means of enforcing federal policies,
and sometimes performs its own inspections to supplement and supervise
state regulators. "

Despite the importance and wide applicability of random inspections in
law enforcement, constitutional doctrines confine random inspections to industries where they can be conducted so frequently as to constitute a perva19See, e.g., 39 C.F.R. § 501.2(c) (1998) (postage meters).
See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 109-27.5105(a) (1998) (precious metals).
21
See, e.g., National Association of Attorneys General, SECURiTES:
20

ATTORNEYS

25 (1980).
See infra note 32. In addition to the examples cited therein, most other states authorize

GENERAL ENFORCEMENT OF BLUE SKY LAws
22

the unannounced inspection of health care facilities. See generally Kira Anne Larson,
Nursing Homes: Standardsof Care, Sources of Potential Liability, Defenses to Suit, and
Reform, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 699, 720 (1988).
23See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 14571.3 (West 1998) (recycling facilities); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-220c(b) (West 1998) (solid waste management facilities); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 2-2456 (1996) (pesticides); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217B.070(1) (same); N.C.
GEN.
STAT. § 106-65.30 (1997) (same).
24

See, e.g., Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management,
reprintedin ALASKA STAT. § 46.45.010, art. III (1998).
25
See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, § 6-204 (1998) (industrialized buildings); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.21" (Michie 1999) (asbestos removal); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 101.92(4)
(mobile
homes).
26

See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 99317.8 (West 1991) (bus-rail transfer stations);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-275(a) (West Supp. 1999) (school buses); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 257.1317 (West 1990) (motor vehicle service facilities); see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 698 n.1 1 (1987) (citing numerous state statutes providing for random inspections of automobile junkyards).
27
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1303(b) (Supp. 1998) (nurseries); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2,
§ 9-206 (West Supp. 2000) (animal feeding operations).
28
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(29) (Michie 1998); 61 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 407.4 (West 1999), Tax. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(15) (West 1998); VA.
CODE
ANN. § 53.1-68 (Michie 1998).
29
See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 302A-1502 (Supp. 1997) (school facilities); IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-17.2-5-16 (West 1994) (child care facilities); VA. CODE. ANN. § 22.1-323(C)
(Michie
1997) (schools for students with disabilities).
30
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-1605(1) (1998).
31
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-26(b)(2)(A) (West 1998) (sale of tobacco to minors); 45
C.F.R.
§ 96.123(a)(5) (1998) (same); 45 C.F.R. § 96.130(d)(1) (1998) (same).
32
See John Braithwaite, The Nursing Home Industry, 18 CRIME & JUST. II, 22 (1993)
(noting that the HCFA "runs 'look-behind' inspections to check that the state governments
are doing their jobs").
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sive regulatory presence. The Fourth Amendment effectively imposes a
lower (but not upper) limit on the frequency of random inspections, and requires that programs operate under neutral procedures that constrain the
discretion of the inspectors.33 The excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of disproportionate civil sanctions. 3
Together, these doctrines require effective deterrence to be based upon the
substantial likelihood of punishment, rather than solely upon the severity of
punishment.
Within this constitutional setting, regulatory programs must also cope
with limited resources for deterring noncompliance, as well as the potential
for bureaucratic corruption. Certain observed modifications in the implementation of random inspection programs may be understood as secondbest approaches to regulatory enforcement under conditions of low deterrent capability35 and/or high incentives for corruption.3 6
A. Warrantless Searches and the Fourth Amendment
Most random inspections are conducted without warrants,37 and thus
operate within a limited range of exceptions to the general Fourth Amendment requirement of a search warrant based on probable cause. 38 The constitutional permissibility of warrantless searches is governed by a line of
U.S. Supreme Court cases that elaborate the meaning of "unreasonable
searches and seizures' '39 by "balanc[ing] the need to search against the inva' 4
sion which the search entails.A
While an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant
may be justified on balance4 ' in cases of emergencies 4 2 or "special needs"
concerning public safety and health, 43 warrantless searches will more typi33

See infra section III.A.
3See
infra section III.B.
35
See infra section III.C.
36
See infra section III.D.
37
A notable exception are Occupational Safety and Health Act inspections, for which
are required (but probable cause is not). See infra text accompanying notes 85 - 89.
warrants
38
See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
39
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
4
Camara,387
41

U.S. at 537.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
42See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that fire inspectors' search of a
store for arson evidence immediately after dousing a fire was constitutional, but police detectives'
43See subsequent search was not).
Camara,387 U.S. at 539 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211
U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of allegedly unfit food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
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cally fall into the "pervasive regulation" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Since the Colonnade" and Biswell4 5 decisions in the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court has held that businesses that are "pervasively regulated ' '
have a diminished expectation of privacy under a theory of implied consent: 47 "In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the
search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute."'' In
such closely regulated industries, warrantless searches are not categorically
unconstitutional, but may be permitted subject to a balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests. A warrantless search will survive Fourth
49
Amendment scrutiny if it: (1) advances important government interests,
50
(2) is necessary to achieve effective law enforcement; and (3) poses only a
limited threat to the business's justifiable expectations of privacy. 1
In Dewey,5 2 the Court reformulated the Colonnade-Biswell analysis as
a two-part test focusing on the pervasiveness of the government presence:
[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help
but be aware that his property
will be subject to periodic inspections under53
taken for specific purposes.
In effect, Dewey established that the first two Biswell balancing factors
are to be left to the reasonable determination of Congress. More importantly, the ruling elevated the last, subjective, factor to a threshold test for
the "pervasive regulation" exception, holding that an industry will be found
to be "pervasively regulated" only if inspections are so frequent that the
business owner reasonably should expect inspections "from time to time. 5 4
(1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (quarantine)).
"Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
45United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
'Id. at 316; see also Colonnade,397 U.S. at 77 (holding that probable cause is not required
in industries that have been "long subject to close supervision and inspection").
47
See Jack M. Kress & Carole D. Iannelli, Administrative Search and Seizure: Whither
the Warrant? 31 ViLL. L. Rnv. 705, 725 (1986) (citing Biswell as establishing "implied consent" test).
4Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
49See id. at 315.
'OSee
id. at 316.
51
See id.
52
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
53
1d. at 600.
5See id. at 599 ("warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally
objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner,
for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be
inspected by government officials").
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5 that limits on the freThe Court subsequently clarified in Burgers
quency of inspections need not be specified in the authorizing statute, 56 so
long as the statute simultaneously constrains official discretion over the
timing of the inspections and informs the regulated businesses of these constraints. 57 Thus, a statute authorizing random inspections would provide
' 58
notice that would be "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant
by specifying limits on the time, place, and scope of inspections. 9
Notably, the Burger analysis focuses on the design of the program of
inspections, rather than on the justifications for any particular inspection.60
A random inspection program may raise Fourth Amendment concerns by
depriving the business owner of the predictability and regularity that would
have been assured by the requirement of probable cause. 6 ' Lower courts

in such63
have acknowledged the potential for abuse of official discretion
62
programs by requiring strict adherence to both the coverage and timing
provisions of the regulatory schemes.
Dewey has been read to require further that a random inspection pro-

gram must be accompanied by neutral guidelines governing the selection of
targets? 4 Where, however, an administrative plan satisfies the threshold

constitutional requirement that it contain neutral restrictions on official discretion, 65 random selection procedures -- even those targeting businesses
55

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
5See id. at 711 n.21.
57
"The statute informs the operator of a vehicle dismantling business that inspections
will be made on a regular basis. Thus, the vehicle dismantler knows that the inspections to
which he is subject do not constitute discretionary acts by a government official but are conducted pursuant to statute.... [T]he "time, place and scope" of the inspection is limited to
place appropriate restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting officers. The officers are
allowed to conduct an inspection only "during [the] regular and usual business hours."
See
id. at 711 (citations omitted).
58
Id. at 703 (quoting Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603).
59 See id. at 711-12.
6°See
Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
61
See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599-600.
62
See United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1993) (close regulation of
trucking industry did not authorize random stops of trucks in general).
commercial
63
See In re Hensley Adco Bucket Division, No. 4-81-34-M, 1981 WL 40358, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. May 15, 1981) (denying inspection warrant where procedures for deciding the number
and order of random inspections in a given year were not disclosed).
"See State v. Campbell, 875 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Donovan,
452 U.S. at 598 - 99.) (random stops of motor vehicles by state troopers).
65See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that ...
the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) ("A
provide[s] assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable unwarrant ...
der the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979)
("[R]egulatory inspections unaccompanied by any quantum of individualized, articulable
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with high compliance costs -- are regarded as neutral and presumed to comport with the Fourth Amendment 6 The Fourth Amendment thus leaves a
wide scope for the implementation of random inspection procedures that are
predictable, neutral and reasonable.
B. Excessive Fines and the Eighth Amendment
An enforcement strategy based on random inspections must take into

account that any penalties for noncompliance will be limited -- if not by
statute, then by the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment 7 The
constitutional requirement that any civil penalty serving a deterrent purpose
must be proportional to the gravity of the offense,68 when combined with
limited enforcement resources and fixed regulatory objectives, may preclude first-order reforms.
The Supreme Court has only recently interpreted the excessive fines

clause, 69 but it is already clear that it covers both criminal and civil penal-

ties payable to the government that have a deterrent purpose. While the
scope of the clause is limited to "only those fines directly imposed by, and
payable to, the hovernment,
it includes in all sanctions that "serv[e] in
part to punish." A sanction will be regarded as a punishment,
and therefore be subject to scrutiny under the excessive fines clause, 72 if it "cannot
suspicion must be undertaken pursuant to previously specified 'neutral criteria'.") (citing
Barlow's,Inc.,.436 U.S. 307).

6See Chicago Aluminum Castings Co., Inc. v. Donovan, 535 F. Supp. 392, 397 (N.D.
I11.1981) ("Inspection of plants in a given industry on a random basis pursuant to an administrative [OSHA] plan containing specific neutral criteria such as that presented here, comports with the Fourth Amendment."), In re Peterson Builders, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 642, 645
(E.D. Wisc. 1981) (same). OSHA targets industries having a high "hazard rating" for more
frequent inspections. See infra text accompanying note 91.
Courts have reviewed the random number tables used to select specific businesses for inspections to ensure that the program is neutral and applied in "a reasonable and nondiscriminatory fashion," but have concluded that such scrutiny is not required for a program to pass
constitutional muster. See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D.
Okla. 1982). See id.; cf. In re Athenian Marble Corp., No. 81-0795-BT, 1981 WL 40360, at
*2, *4 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 1981) (finding random number tables for OSHA inspections
privileged from discovery under 29 U.S.C. § 666(0).
67
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive68fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
69
See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262
(1989) ("[T]his Court has never considered an application of the Excessive Fines Clause.");
Austin, 590 U.S. at 606 ("We have had occasion to consider this Clause only once before [in
Browning-Ferris].").
70

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 268.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
72
1d. at 622 - 23 (remanding to district court for scrutiny); United States v. Ursery, 518
U.S. 267, 285 - 90 (1996) (declining to conduct excessiveness analysis at preliminary stage
of determining whether sanction constituted punishment).
71
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fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." 73 Assuming that the theory of deterrence ascribed by the Court to random
inspections in various contexts 74 applies generally to regulatory programs
that use random inspections, the Court should proceed to determine whether
the fines are excessive within the meaning of the clause.
Although there is as yet no bright-line rule for evaluating a civil penalty for excessiveness, 75 the Eighth Amendment has generally been read to
to the offense committed.
prohibit punishments that are disproportionate
76
As the Court held in Solem v. Helm:
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including: (i) the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.77

Notably, the excessiveness analysis does not consider a low probability
of detection and punishment to be a factor weighing in favor of severe punishment. The finding of a deterrent purpose is relevant to deciding whether
a sanction should be analyzed under the excessive fines clause, but is not
germane to the analysis itself.
The Eighth Amendment thus imposes independent constraints on the
penalties that can be imposed under a random inspection program. This
implies that an enforcement strategy cannot be based solely on high punitive fines, but must also include an effective program of frequent inspections that maximize the expected cost of sanctions and support a culture of
compliance.

73

Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (finding that important
governmental concem in "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren" supported
random drug testing of high school athletes); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1983) (finding substantial governmental interest supported random boat
searches "in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great"); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660 (1979) (imputing a deterrent purpose to a random traffic stop program, but finding the program not "sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972) ("[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced,
even frequent, inspections are essential."); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 293 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that random spot checks of automobiles
Patrol were necessary to "maintaining any kind of credible deterrent").
by Border
75
See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines
Clause, 76 N.C. L. REv. 407,457 (1998).
76463 U.S. 277 (1983).
74

77Id. at 291.
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C. Case Examples of Random Inspection Programs
The effectiveness of random inspection programs is constrained not

only by constitutional doctrines, but by agency resources. Agencies that enforce regulations by threatening penalties are especially vulnerable to
budget cutbacks because they cannot turn to alternative sources of support,
such as user fees.
1. OSHA
Attempts to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Ace 8 by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Department of Labor

provide a paradigmatic example of these difficulties. In 1996, thenSecretary of Labor Robert Reich observed that "random, surprise inspections remain one of OSHA's most effective enforcement tools in the prevention of injuries, illnesses and fatalities." 79 Nevertheless, the shortage of
enforcement resources available to OSHA is longstanding and widely acknowledged, 80 and has had the practical effect of limiting the frequency of
surprise inspections by the agency.

From its beginning, OSHA's inspectorate has been staffed at less than
a quarter of that needed to meet the minimal goal of one inspection per year
of employers in high-risk industries and one inspection per decade of em-

ployers in low-risk industries. 8' Today, OSHA has fewer employees than it
7829 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-78 (West 1999). Workplace safety regulations are necessary because workers have inadequate information and bargaining power with respect to the risks
they assume on the job. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, JudicialReview, and
Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 648 (1997).
Agency
79 Resources: OSHA as a
Labor-HHS Budget Impasse: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (testimony of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
93450, at *21-23 (Mar. 5, 1996).
80
In 1995, an administrative law judge refused to find the agency responsible for policing
workplace violence, noting that such a responsibility "would most surely tax OSHA's limited resources in ways difficult to control." See Secretary of Labor v. Megawest Financial,
Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1338 (1995).
Other commentators have observed that OSHA has been so "feckless and beleagured"
that the agency itself is deterred from vigorous enforcement of workplace regulations "for
fear that Congress will massively reduce its funding and authority." See Marc Linder, Smart
Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace FootwearRequirementsfor Female Employees, 22 J.CoRP. L. 295, 327 (1997); see also Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional
Authority and Responsibility over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARV. J.LEGIs. 323, 327
(1996) ("instructions [in conference reports] put [agency regulators] on notice to comply or
face possible future retaliation (e.g., funding cuts or explicit denials of funds for certain purposes)").
81
Rothstein, OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and Some ProposedReforms, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 71, 94-95 (1981).

Spoiling the Surprise

20:99 (1999)
had during its first year of operation, 2 and its inspection programs have
only become more inadequate. Only one out of twenty-five job sites within
OSHA's jurisdiction has ever been visited by an OSHA inspector.83 The
budget crises of recent years have only exacerbated the problem. During
the second 1996 government shutdown, OSHA delayed more than 1,440
random safety inspections.84
The early failure to develop OSHA into a pervasive regulatory regime
also resulted in a constitutional obstacle to enforcement efforts. In Marshall v. Barlow's,85 the Supreme Court found that OSHA regulations were
86
not sufficiently pervasive to fall under the Colonnade-Biswell exception.
This finding left the Court free to hold that warrants must be secured prior
to a surprise OSHA inspection, 87 despite its finding that probable cause was
not in issue and despite the Secretary of Labor's objection that the warrant
requirement would destroy the element of surprise and unduly strain an already beleaguered inspection system.8 9
As sections HI.A and IH.B of this article have emphasized, both the effectiveness and constitutionality of regulatory enforcement require that random inspections be frequent and pervasive. By decimating the frequency of
inspections, OSHA's underfimding is, in Reich's words, "tantamount to repealing" the labor safety laws.90
The agency has done its best to cope. The structure of OSHA's safety
inspection program represents a flexible response to severe financial constraints. The agency's national office assigns each industry a "hazard rating
value," and provides each area office with lists of industry workplaces
within its region. 91 Using a random number table, the area office then selects the projected number of sites to be inspected during the fiscal year.92
82

See Shapiro, supra note 78, at 647.
THOMAS 0. MCGARrTY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE

83

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 212 (1993).
8See Job Safety

Inspections Again DeferredDuring ContinuingGovernment Shutdown,

DAILY
85 LAB. REP. (BNA-DLR) No. 2, at A6 (Jan. 3, 1996).

Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
asSee id. at 321.
S7See id. at 325.
85See id. at 320.
See id. at 316.
9°During the House Appropriations Committee hearings on the 1996 budget impasse,

Reich testified:
Simply put, the House-passed cuts would gut the enforcement of workplace protection laws. For example, they will harm our agencies' ability to conduct random, surprise enforcement measures,
which provide a deterrent to employers who would otherwise try to cut their costs by endangering
their workers's safety, working them beyond legal hours, paying them less than the minimum wage
or flouting other minimum workplace standards.

Reich, supra note 79, at *18.
91
F. Supp. 176, 179 (W.D. OK. 1982).
92See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535

See id.
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The selected sites are grouped into one or more "cycles," each containing at
least ten sites.93 The inspections within each cycle may be conducted in any
order that uses resources efficiently, but all inspections in a cycle must be
completed (with only limited exceptions) before the next cycle is begun.94
Underfunding of OSHA's inspection program, combined with low
statutory limits on civil penalties, 95 create a tension between the first-order
goal of increasing the probability of inspections and the second-order goal
of reducing variation in the probability of inspections. The structure of the
inspection program reflects what might be best characterized as an optimistic attempt to reconcile these two goals under adverse conditions. The
minimum of ten sites per cycle encourages all area offices to maximize the
frequency of inspections given the available resources. Each area office,
however, may choose a different number of cycles according to the relative
importance of making the probability of inspections more uniform. In those
few regions and industries where OSHA inspections provide adequate deterrence, area offices are free to direct their resources toward second-order
reforms.
2. Nursing Homes
A contrasting area of regulation is the regulation of nursing homes and
other health care facilities, where frequent inspections are required by both
federal and state law.9 6 Largely in response to strong pressure from con93

See id.

94

See id.

95

While the cost of compliance with OSHA standards can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, see, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 527 n.44
(1981), the maximum civil penalty provided by the Act for the violation of a standard is
$70,000. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (West 1998). Although this limit is considerably higher
than the original $10,000 maximum, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 3101(2) (1990), these penalties cannot be expected to deter violations where
compliance costs are high. As one commentator explains:
OSHA could theoretically be empowered to increase fines progressively against a recalcitrant employer until adequate compliance is finally achieved. Given the staggering costs associated with
some health and safety measures, however, the size of such fines would have to be exceedingly
large....

Massive civil fines in this context are [politically] unattractive.... Huge civil fines would take money
directly away from corporate violators hence increasing the cost of the OSHAct to industry while
doing nothing to benefit workers directly.

Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,9691 YALE L.J. 1446, 1459, 1473 & n.63 (1982).
See generally Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 21-27 (1993); Kira Anne Larson, Note,
Nursing Homes: Standards of Care, Sources of PotentialLiability, Defenses to Suit, and
Reform, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 699, 720-21 (1988). Larson criticizes the level of federal funding
for nursing home inspections, citing a 1979 article, but notes that after the reforms of the
1980s, "the future looks brighter for nursing home residents." See id. (citing Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 57 N.C.
L. REv. 1317 (1979)).
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sumer groups, unprecedented resources are now dedicated to the inspection
of federally funded health care facilities.97 A 1993 survey of nursing home
inspections in twenty-four states found strong institutional support for firstand second-order reform; i.e., frequent, regular inspections, a high probability of detecting noncompliance, and flexible, adequate sanctions:
Not only is the consistent frequency of inspection much more impressive
than in other areas of regulation, the intensity of the scrutiny is far more finegrained than for occupational health and safety,98 environmental, food, or pharmaceuticals inspectors in any country we know.
Under the threat of sanctions that may include administrative penalties,
suspension of new admissions, license revocation, and criminal prosecution,
compliance is achieved 90 percent of the time without formal enforcement
actions.99 Deterrence in these cases, is "implicit and real."' 0 "[T]he United
States has tougher nursing home enforcement than any country we know;
or Japan."' 0'
stronger than in Australia, and much stronger than in England
3. The FCC and Industry Self-Regulation
Lying somewhere between the unhappy state of OSHA enforcement
and the promised land of nursing home regulation are the new and largely
uncharted territories of industry self-regulation. 0 2 While a full assessment
of self-regulation is beyond the scope of this Article,10 3 the rational actor
model raises a fundamental criticism of certain self-regulatory regimes.
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted an Alternative
Broadcast Inspection Program under which stations are subject to inspection by state broadcast associations. When a station passes an inspection
conducted under the program, the association notifies the FCC, which then
exempts the station from random inspections by the local FCC field office
for a period of two or three years.1° 4

97
See Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 26-27 (describing the Reagan administration as a
"period of unparalleled regulatory growth" in the health care industry, and noting "substantial further growth under President Bush").
9
Id. at 22.
99See id. at 23-24.
'I01d. at 29.
'01 id. at 24-25.
'02The term "self-regulation" here refers to the delegation of powers to implement federal laws or regulations by the federal government to a non-governmental organization, typically consisting of regulated entities and their representatives. See Douglas C. Michael,
FederalAgency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L.
REv. 171, 175-76 (1995).
'0 'For an excellent review and assessment, see id.
t'4See Notice of Public Information Collections Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission, 61 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6007 (1996).
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One claimed advantage of self-regulation is that it reduces the cost of
compliance and thereby fosters a culture of compliance. 0 5 The FCC's experiment with self-regulation, however, cannot be defended on these
grounds. If there is a legitimate justification for the exemptions, it is that
exempted stations will tend to be firms for which compliance costs are
relatively low, and the FCC will compensate for any losses in compliance
due to the exemptions by accelerating random inspections of the nonexempted stations. More commonly, however, self-regulation programs in
the United States are developed in the context of budget cutbacks, where
the lost inspections are viewed as cost savings 0 6 rather than as opportunities for targeting stations with high compliance costs.
Viewed from the cost-saving perspective, the Alternative Broadcast Inspection Program cannot be said to foster a culture of compliance. To claim
this is to make the category error of counting a reduction (to zero!) in the
probability of random inspections as a reduction in the cost of compliance.
Instead, the two- to three-year exemption from programmed FCC inspections effectively eliminates the expected cost of sanctions during this period, increases the variation in the probability of inspections, and results in
lower aggregate compliance unless the marginal cost of two years of compliance for all exempted firms is zero."0 7 Even the most sanguine proponents of self-regulation would find it difficult to claim such time
economies. In eneral, linking the probability of surprise inspections to
past compliance 1%is a clumsy and risky way to create a culture of compliance.
4. Banks
In the United States, banks are subject to regulation by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and various state agencies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the federal bank regulation
system did not effectively martial limited resources to achieve maximum
105

See Michael, supra note 102, at 183-84 ("[I]ncentives [for compliance] are increased
not because the regulated entity is now suddenly more willing to comply but because compliance has become easier (less costly) and has been recognized as consistent with and not
impairing or opposing the entity's goals.").
'°6See
Michael,supranote 102, at 184.
107The Florida Association of Broadcasters further assures that they "will not notify the

FCC of your station's participation in the Alternative Inspection Program until the contract
inspector has signed off on the station." See The FAB/FCC Alternative Inspection Program,
(visited March 16, 1998) <http://www.fab.org/fccaip.htm>. This confidentiality effectively
prevents the FCC from taking any steps before the inspection to compensate for the elimina-

tion of the cost of noncompliance after the inspection.
'"8For another example, see T x. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(15) (West 1997) (providing that announced and unannounced inspections of each jail will be based in part on its
history of compliance).
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compliance. Although each of the federal agencies determined its own
policy for inspection frequency, all of them sought to tie frequency to past
compliance. 1 At the same time, the agencies failed to respond to resource
constraints by targeting banks with high compliance costs. For example, an
understaffed FDIC in 1988 inspected 75 percent of the healthy banks in its
jurisdiction, but fewer than half of the problem banks.1 0
Section 111 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199111 has brought greater uniformity to the inspection regime
and reduced the correlation between compliance and inspection frequency.
Specifically, the statute requires that each agency conduct a full-scope onsite examination of each insured depository institution that it supervises at
least once every 12 months. 1 12 Small insured banks that are well-managed
well-capitalized, and have not experienced a change in control during the3
previous 12 months, are permitted to be examined once every 18 months."
Certain government-controlled banks are exempted from these requirements. ' 4 By standardizing and improving confidence in the agencies' inspection schedules while allowing the agencies to target banks with high
compliance costs," 5 the 1991 act has significantly strengthened the federal
bank regulation system.
D. Anti-Corruption Provisions
Most statutory random inspection programs do not provide specific
sanctions for tipping-off targets. At the federal level, the two exceptions are

19In the 1970s, the agencies conducted examinations of sound banks every 12 to 18

months and more frequent examinations of unsound banks. See FEDERAL REGULATION OF
BANKING 54-55 (1981). With respect to sound banks, the OCC set different inspection frequencies depending on the size of the bank's assets, while the FDIC and Federal Reserve
Board varied their inspection frequencies in coordination with state regulators. Id. In the
1980s, the OCC dropped its policy requiring examinations at specified intervals in favor of a
case-by-case approach.

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and

Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
418 (1987).
"0 H.R. REP. No. 100-1088, at 63 (1988).
"' 12 U.S.C. 1820(d).
2
id.
11312
114 12 U.S.C.
U.S.C. 1820(d)(4).
1820(d)(5).
5
1 As the agencies recently noted in promulgating regulations under section 111:
The Agencies have determined that ... [the statutory framework] is generally consistent with the
safety and soundness of insured depository institutions assuming the absence of other risk factors. A
longer examination schedule permits the Agencies to focus their resources on the segments of the
banking and thrift industry that present the most immediate supervisory concern, while concomitantly reducing the regulatory burden on smaller, well-run institutions that do not pose an equivalent
level of supervisory concerns.

Expanded Examination Cycle for Certain Small Insured Institutions, 62 Fed. Reg. 6449,

6451 (1997).
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OSHA and the corresponding mine safety and health statute, MSHA. 1 6
The OSHA and MSHA statutes both provide that giving advance notice of a
surprise inspection is a crime punishable by six months' imprisonment
and/or a $1,000 fine" 7 However, even in these cases, however, the legislative intent does not seem to have been to deter corruption. Instead, from
the beginning, Congress regarded the prohibition against giving advance
notice of a surprise inspection as an integral part of the protections provided
by the statutes.' 18 However, consistent with the demise of OSHA's other
good intentions, 119 these crimes have never been prosecuted. 120 Given the
low incentives for corrupt tip-offs about OSHA inspections,' 2' more vigilant enforcement of these laws does not appear to have been warranted.
At the state level, specific sanctions for the disclosure of unannounced
regulatory inspections have been enacted only in the context of health care
facilities. 22 Punishments range from a five-day suspension123 to a felony
conviction, 24 and may vary according to the rank of the official involved.'2
It is unclear to what extent tip-offs are a problem or how vigorously these
provisions are enforced. 26 In any case, however, the appearance of such
11630

U.S.C.A. §§ 801-962 (West 1998).

11729 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West 1998); 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(e) (West 1998).

...
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b)(10) (West 1998) (stating that one of the Act's purposes is
"to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources ... by providing an effective enforcement program which shall include a prohibition against giving advance notice of any
inspection").
" 90See supra text accompanying notes 78 - 95.
12 See Barbra Marcus et al., Employment-Related Crimes, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 457,
459 (1997).
121 The analysis in part II supra shows, inter alia, that where penalties for noncompliance
are negligible, incentives for corruption will be low. See supra note 95 (describing OSHA's
low penalties for noncompliance).
122See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1309(d)(1) (1997) (health care residence facilities);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.19(3) (West 1997) (nursing homes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.16(l)
(West 1997) (health care facilities); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.10(2) (West 1997) (nursing
homes); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-6024 (1996) (nursing homes); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2803(1)(a) (McKinney 1997) (hospitals); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 461-a(2)(a)(2) (McKinney
1997) (adult care facilities); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.052 (West 1997)
(end-stage renal disease facilities); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.045 (West
1997) (nursing homes); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 252.042 (West 1997) (facilities for the mentally retarded); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.03(2)(c) (West 1998) (nursing homes).
12
3See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.19(3) (West 1997); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803(l)(a)
(McKinney 1997); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 461-a(2)(a)(2) (McKinney 1997); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 50.03(2)(c) (West 1998).
124 See TEx. HEA.TH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.045 (West 1997).
25See

NEB. Rev. STAT.

§ 71-6024 (1996) (providing that any director or deputy director

who26gives advance notice of an inspection shall be subject to $5,000 fine).
1 A search of Westlaw, ALLCASES database, found no reported case referring to any
of the prohibitions against disclosure of unannounced inspections cited in note 122 supra.
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care context atexplicit anti-corruption measures exclusively in the health
27
tests to the vitality of the underlying regulatory regime.1
IV. RANDOM INSPECTIONS AND BANKING REGULATION IN JAPAN

At the time of the Ministry scandal, Japanese banks, including their
foreign branches, were supervised by two institutions, the Ministry and the
2
Bank of Japan, which conducted three distinct types of bank inspections.' 1
First, the Banking Bureau of the Ministry conducted highly detailed surprise inspections directed to ensuring that the bank ran soundly. 129 Second,
the Bank of Japan conducted less exacting scheduled examinations aimed at
maintaining the soundness of the financial system 130 and protecting its contractual agreements with institutional accountholders.13' Finally, the International Finance Bureau of the Ministry conducted examinations to
supervise the foreign exchange operations of banks. 132 The Banking Bureau's inspection program is most germane to the subject of this Article. ' 33
Article 25 of the Banking Law of 1981, entitled "Spot Inspection,"
authorized the Ministry to inspect all bank facilities and offices whenever
"necessary in order to secure the healthy and suitable operations of the
business of the bank.' 134 The Banking Bureau aimed to inspect each bank
at least once every three years, 135 but the frequency of these surprise inspections was subject to numerous pressures and various circumstances.
The chief constraint on the frequency of inspections has been the size
of the bank inspection staff.'3 6 Overall, Japan's financial inspection officials number about 1,000, only about one-eighth of those in the United
States, 137 and their competence has been called into question. 138 Since

Of course, the imposition of a sanction is unlikely to go to trial because of the size of the
punishment
involved is generally small.
127See supra text accompanying notes 96 - 101.
28
1

See Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking

in the
InternationalArena,13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 295-96 (1990).
29

1 See Bill Shaw & John R. Rowlett, Reforming the U.S. Banking System: Lessonsfrom

Abroad, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 91, 107 (1993).
130See id.
31
1 See MAXIMILIAN J. B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 149 (1993)
Nihon Ginko Ho [Bank of Japan Law], Law No. 67 of 1942, arts. 42-44).
(citing
132

See Cane, supra note 128, at 295-96.

133 See id. at 295 n.162.
34

1

Ginko Ho (Banking Law), Law No. 59 of 1981, art. 25 [hereinafter Banking Law].

135 5ee HALL, supra note 131, at 169 n.81; see also Cane, supra note 128, at 295 (every
two or three years); Arrested MOF Inspector Shelved Finding on Bad Loans, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR,
Feb. 2, 1998 (every three or four years).
136 See HALL, supra note 131, at 169 nn.80-81.
137 See FSA Plans to Strengthen Staff by 200-300 in FY 1999, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR,

Aug. 17, 1998.
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1988, scarce regulatory resources have been rationalized by varying the fre-

quency and intensity of inspections according to banks' net worth ratios, as-

set quali , management control systems, profitability, liquidity,139 location,
and size. 4 These resources and policies have in turn been subject to political tides in the wake of highly publicized financial scandals, most notably
in 1991,141 when the target inspection cycle for city banks was reduced from

41 to 36 months.' 42 A final factor influencing the frequency of inspections

was the coordination of scheduling between the Ministry and the Bank of
Japan so that each bank is inspected annually. 43
In contrast to the situation in the United States,' 44 Japan's Constitution
imposes no practical constraints on random inspection programs. The
Showa Constitution generally prohibits warrantless searches,
but there
are many exceptions to this doctrine, 146 and the Japanese High Court in at
least one case has allowed a warrantless search after balancing the extent of
the invasion against the importance of the evidence at trial. 147 Further, there
is no explicit constitutional prohibition against excessive fines. 148 There3

1 8 See

Jathon Sapsford, Japan'sMost Powerful Banks are Viewed as Rescuers, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at A10 (quoting economist Richard Koo's assessment that only 200
Japanese bank inspectors "are considered any good"); Rookies Run Rule Over Banks,
FINANCIAL
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at 15.
39
1 See Hall, supra note 131, at 15 1.
'4°See id. at 169 n.81.
141 See Colin P.A. Jones, JapaneseBanking Reform: A Legal Analysis ofRecent Developments, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 432-33 (1993) (identifying 1991 banking scandals 42as impetus for Financial System Reform Act).
1 See HALL, supra note 131, at 169 n.81.
141See id. at 149 -150.
144See supra sections III.A and III.B.
145
Article 35 of the Showa Constitution states:
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and
seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 33.
Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate wan-ant by a competent judicial officer.
KENPO, art. 35.
146See, e.g., Banking Law, supra note 134, art. 25 (allowing Minister of Finance, "when
he deems it necessary in order to secure the healthy and suitable operations of the business of
the bank," to conduct bank inspections); Industrial Safety and Health Law, Law No. 57 of
1972, art. 91 (authorizing Labour Standards Inspectors, "where they deem it necessary in order to enforce this Law," to inspect workplaces and confiscate equipment without compensation); see also Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of
New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 127, 160 (1994) ("[A]lthough the
Showa Constitution seems to provide protection against unauthorized searches and seizures,
the law has stretched the exceptions to an almost unbelievable extent.").
147See id. at 159 & n.l10 (citing Judgment of Dec. 26, 1983, Sapporo Kosai (High
Court), 1111 Hanji 143, 144-46 (Japan)).
148One commentator has suggested that punitive fines, when coupled with criminal penalties, may fall within the double jeopardy prohibition of Article 39. See Mitsuo Matsuhita,
The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12
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fore, the structure of the Banking Bureau's spot inspection program is constrained by resources, not by constitutional doctrine.
In principle, the structure of the Banking Bureau's spot inspection program represented a fairly sound approach to enforcement using limited resources. The Bureau's policies were directed to maximizing the overall
frequency of inspections while also targeting its scrutiny at those banks that
were most likely to have high compliance costs. (Coordinating inspection
schedules with the Bank of Japan created perturbations in the bureau's inspection probability distributions, but this second-order effect was not a
cause for great concern.) Even more significantly, the Bureau's capacity
for imposing sanctions was potentially so high as to be coercive. 149 A further source of potential deterrent capability was the informal system of ad-

ministrative guidance 5that
accompanies the Ministry's multiple regulatory
0

and managerial roles. 1

This picture changed drastically, however, when corruption came into
view. The Ministry's wide-ranging and potentially conflicting roles gave it
"the largest authority and strongest power in Japan."''
Vagueness in Japan's banking laws further strengthened the Ministry's hand. As one commentator has noted, the "lack of transparency [in the banking statutes]
compels companies to develop close relationships with ministries and agen436, 448 & n.33 (1991). Article 39 of the Showa Constitution states, "No
person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy." KENPo,
art. 39.
The Constitution also prohibits "[t]he infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel
punishment," KIN o, art. 36, but the courts have rarely applied this doctrine even in cases of
extensive physical and psychological abuse, let alone monetar penalties. See Ramlogan,
supra note 146, at 181-82.
149Under the Banking Law of 1981, the Ministry of Finance had the power to revoke
banks' licenses for violation of any law, articles of incorporation, or ministry regulations, see
Banking Law, supra note 134, at art. 27; to suspend the bank's business or freeze its assets
when it deems necessary, see id. at art. 26; and to approve a wide variety of banking decisions including the opening and closing of branches and reductions in the level of capital
held below a certain minimum, see HALL, supra note 131, at 149. The Banking Law provided civil and criminal penalties of up to three million yen and three years imprisonment for
violation of the ministry's licensing and examination requirements. See Banking Law, arts.
61-66.
150
See Cane & Barclay, supra note 128, at 289:
[T]rue regulatory power over Japanese banks resides in the MOF. The Banking Law of 1927 grants
the MOF such broad supervisory powers that its responsibilities have been likened to "those of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, state banking commissions and policy-making responsibilities of the FRB." Within this broad grant of power, the MOF
MICH. J. INT'LL.

has considerable discretion to tailor its regulations and policies to the needs of individual banks in

return for their voluntary cooperation with MOF directives. This regulatory style is called gyosel-shido,
or administrative guidance.
5
1 1The ministry sets Japan's budget and economic policy, intervenes on foreign exchange
markets, grants business licenses, and issues advice to industry that is generally followed.
See Suzuki, supra note 5.
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cies in order to know whether their activities comply with current interpretations of the laws on the books.', 152 As the analysis in part II shows, however, the very potency of the Ministry's discretionary enforcement power
created a powerful incentive for corruption that would be difficult to resist
even in an arm's-length relationship. In fact, the tip-offs occurred in a web
of close social relationships among bank officials and Bureau inspectors, 5 3
an environment rich in opportunities for collusion and poor in safeguards of
accountability.
The unusually intense public furor in the wake of the scandal led to a
pledge by Japan's major banks to abolish their MOF-tan, or "ministry handler," system, in which bank officials had been specifically assigned to cultivate social relationships with ministry officials. 54 More urgent economic
and political pressures, however, initially distracted the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party from large-scale banking reforms.' 55 The incoming Finance Minister Hikaru Matsunaga immediately ruled out a full breakup of
the Ministry and 1offered
no programs to prevent future corruption in the
56
banking industry.
Elections in July 1998, however, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in favor of Keizo Obuchi, who took office pledging to reform Japan's banks and to take the country out of recession. 57 At
about the same time, Japan's new Financial Supervisory Agency took over
the Banking Bureau's inspection program and most of its staff, under the direction of Masaharu Hino, a public prosecutor and banking industry outsider.158 The agency marked Obuchi's first day in office by ordering
penalties for eight banks involved in the bribery scandals. 59 Despite having just 165 inspectors, many of them inexperienced,' 60 the agency also
conducted inspections of all of Japan's major commercial banks between
152See

id.
15 3 See infra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the MOF-tan ("ministry handler') system).
154
See More JapaneseBanks Linked to Bribery, supra note 7. Choy, supra note 1, describes the MOF-tan system:
Banks and other financial and non-financial firms admit to having special groups of employees
whose only job is to develop and maintain friendly relations with relevant ministry functionaries....
[T]he relationship-building usually takes place outside regular business hours in the form of dinners
or, sometimes, golfing weekends, trips and other leisure activities. These lengthy affairs are supposed to provide the time to develop close personal ties and to discuss issues in depth. Critics now
say that they also serve as a convenient channel to curry favor with key bureaucrats.

55See id.
15 6 See Landers, on file with author.
157See Nayan Chanda, Surges ofDepression,FARE. ECON. REv., Dec. 31, 1998, at 22.
' See Rookies Run Rule Over Banks, supranote 138.
' 59 See Japan'sNew Watchdog Bites the Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998, at 3.
16OSee New JapanBank Watchdog Faces Herculean Task, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at

Al.
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July and October 1998.161 When the audits revealed that the Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank were insolvent, the FSA exercised its power to nationalize them. 62 Bolstering the agency's authority
over the remaining banks is an attractive carrot in the form of a $260 billion
line of credit the government has made available to banks that convince the
regulators they are committed to reform. 63 The agency has also been willing to use a large stick - the threat of license revocation -- in support of its
new inspection practices. 164 The FSA's staff of inspectors is growing rapidly and is expected to have more than 1,000 in the year 2000.165 If the
FSA maintains this focus on confronting corruption and challenging resource constraints, Japan's random bank inspection program is 66
likely to become the highly effective regulatory tool it was designed to be.1
Japan's lawmakers can assist the reform efforts at the FSA in two
ways. First, specific provisions are needed to combat corruption in the random inspection program. The agency's August crackdown and the Japanese legislature's proposal of a code of ethics for civil servants' 67 are a good
start, but direct prohibitions against tip-offs, backed by coercive sanctions,
need to be built into the inspection program's framework and vigorously
enforced. Second, institutional support for the close informal relationships
that breed corruption should be dismantled. In addition to the banks' move
to abolish the MOF-tan system,' 68 the legislature should clarify the banking
laws to reduce agency discretion and resulting opportunities for collusion.

61

1

See Top 17 Banks' Bad Loans Worth 49 Tril. Yen in March: FSA, JAPAN WKLY.

MONITOR,
Dec. 28, 1998.
62
1 See Gov't to Nationalize Troubled LTCB, JAPAN WKLY. MONrTOR, Oct. 26, 1998;
Robert Whymant, JapaneseBank Nationalisedto Shore Up Sector, TIMES OF LONDON, Dec.

14, 1998,
at41.
163 See Jathon Sapsford, Funding Depends on Cleanup Plans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1999,
at A17.
164The FSA's draft bank inspection manual states that any bank that fails to follow the
agency's risk management framework will have its license revoked. See FSA Preparing
Tough
Bank Inspection Manual,JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Dec. 7, 1998.
65
1 See Japan Aims to Double Bank-InspectorRanks, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at

4.

166Tellingly, inspections at Credit Suisse First Boston and Sumitomo Bank in January
and February 1999 were unannounced and unexpected, and agency directors were planning
to continue the practice of secrecy and surprise. See Japan Watchdog Inspects Credit Suisse
First Boston Office, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 21, 1999; FS,4 Completes Sumitomo Bank Market Risk
Management Inspection, AFX NEwS, March 2, 1999.
167 See Barbara Wanner, FinancialScandals Renew Focus on BureaucraticPower, JEI

REP., 8Mar. 6, 1998.
16Major banks have also instituted a ban on entertaining government officials or executives of public corporations. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Given the United States' apparent lack of experience with large-scale
corruption involving tip-offs of surprise inspections, the recent Japanese
banking scandal may be the most instructive case study available for understanding the problem and considering solutions. Part II of this Article presented the theoretical case for specific anti-corruption sanctions to
accompany random inspection programs. The Japanese experience de-

scribed in Part IV can provide further empirical support for such sanctions,
provided that American regulators are as willing
to learn from Japan's diffi69
culties as they have been to offer advice.

Corruption is not as prevalent in practice as theory predicts. The decision of whether or not to accept a bribe in return for advance disclosure of a
random inspection is not based solely on a weighing of the available rents
against the expected penalties. Observed penalties for tip-offs are too rare
and too small70 to be explained by a pure deterrence theory. Similarly,
compliance in practice is often more common than theory predicts. Despite
this, the theoretical analysis presented in this Article should
17 be taken seriously for the concerns it raises and the reforms it suggests. 1
This gap between theory and practice provides some play in the joints
of reform proposals. For example, it seems reasonable to view Japan's
bank rating system 172 as a positive reform measure designed to rationalize
limited inspectorate staff, even if it is unclear whether the first-order pre' 69 See MOF to Hire Foreign Experts, AsAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 7, 1998 (reporting that the
Ministry of Finance had invited advisors from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

and the Federal Reserve Board); Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Bank Overhaul Lacks Crucial

Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998 (noting that U.S. government officials "have given unusually
detailed public advice to Japan on the shape of its bank reforms").
170See supra section III.D.
171As Braithwaite writes in the nursing home context:
[C]ompliance arises more from a desire to go along with authoritative requests to comply
with the law or authoritative suggestions to act in a professionally responsible way than from
any rational weighing of the costs and benefits of compliance.... Voluntary compliance is
underwritten by deterrence, but not in a way that often leads the [regulated business] to calculate about the actual levels and probabilities of deterrent threats. Because of this, even
when these actual levels and probabilities are zero, orchestration of an appearance that they
are nonzero will often be enough to do the job.... Needless to say, however, such state
authority is a fragile accomplishment and therefore hardly a basis for sound regulatory policy.
Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 29-30. See also Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does
Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & Soc'Y

REv. 177, 178 (1993) (noting that empirical studies of OSHA enforcement suggest that
"[t]he complexity of perceptual processes that intervene between the threat or experience of
legal sanctions and illegal actions may weaken the link between enforcement activities and
deterrence."); see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES chs.
14, 19, 21-23 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds, 1982) (describing human biases in calculation of
probabilities
from experience).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 139 - 140.
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condition of adequate deterrence has been met. On the other hand, the departure from the rational actor model also allows that policy changes may
have a signaling function. The Alternative Broadcast Inspection Program
may be interpreted as a vote of confidence in self-regulation or, perversely,
as a license to violate the law after the initial inspection.
As Japan's banking regulators are learning, random inspections present
unique and complex problems of law and policy reform under tight constitutional, fiscal, prudential, and political constraints. This Article is an invitation to the task of solving them.
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